Soybeans and their products accounted for nearly 40 percent of the trading on all commodities exchanges. Of the total growth of contracts of 357 percent from 1960 to 1970, approximately 119 percent is attributable to new commodities. The success of the cattle, frozen pork belly, and plywood contracts indicated that the feasible set of tradable commodities on organized exchanges could be expanded to include live animals semi-and fully processed commodities. The numerous new commodities traded provided alternative markets for producers, helped to disseminate price and industrial data and to facilitate the efficient redistribution of risk through the mechanism of hedging. In spite of the importance of new contracts in the recent growth of commodity trading and the fact that almost all major commodity exchanges have developed new and successful contracts, there have been no studies on the research and development activity which is undertaken prior to the initiation of trading. This paper will provide a description and an understanding of this activity by presenting a case study of the development of the plywood contract on the Chicago Board of Trade. The main purpose here is to indicate the nature of
the research and development activity in an exchange and provide insight into its relationship to other departments and members of the exchange. This study is of interest for numerous reasons. Although other contracts approached its success, during the entire decade of the 1960's, no single commodity had been as actively traded as the plywood contract was in its first twelve months. (The lumber contract, which was introduced at approximately the same time, matched its success initially but not thereafter.) The contract, which started on December 1, 1969, was developed by the Chicago Board of Trade, the world's largest futures exchange. The Chicago Board of Trade was subject to active competition by the New York Mercantile Exchange which initiated trading in a plywood contract earlier but without success.
The plywood contract is an example of a nonregulated commodity on an exchange which also trades regulated commodities: it therefore permits an analysis of exchange behavior under two different constraints-selfregulation and government regulation. The design of any new futures contract is of interest because of the nature of the product and the innovating organization. The process is also of interest because it describes the development of a contract by an impartial party which, after several modifications, converges to an agreement acceptable to such diverse groups as industrial producers, warehouses, and users as well as speculators. Innovation in an organization functioning as a membership association is also of interest because it may be applicable to similar types of organizations. This paper is divided into five sections. Section I gives a recent history of the introduction of new futures contracts. Section II presents background material and Section III discusses the prerequisites for a successful futures contract. Section IV contains a description of the contract design; specifically, the focus is on initial design and convergence to final form, analyzing the use of new information in redrafting the contract, and the role of different individuals in contract design. The last section contains a summary and conclusions.
I. A Recent
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief description of new contract History of the innovations by commodity exchanges since 1960. This will supply the reader Introduction of with a background on the success and failure of innovations as well as its role New Futures in the growth of some selected exchanges. Table 1 contains information Contracts relating to the new contracts introduced by all of the various exchanges since 1960. In order to provide a comparison with established markets, the volumes of some selected commodities traded on the two exchanges which are of particular interest are presented in Table 2 .
Between 1960 and 1970,56 new contracts have been introduced by the various exchanges. If a successful contract is defined as one with an annual volume of 1,000 or more contracts then eighteen would be termed successful. It is important to emphasize that 1,000 contracts is an arbitrary number and a volume which is exceedingly low. It has been used because an exchange would probably not delist a commodity with that volume.
An examination of Table 1 indicates that different exchanges have shown different levels of activity in the introduction of new contracts. It is clear from a comparison of Table 1 and Table 2 that a new contract may have a trading volume anywhere within the range of those that have been in existence.
Another fact worth noting is that different exchanges have varied in their dependence on new contracts for growth. This is illustrated in Table 3 .
It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the comparative role of innovation among the various exchanges. Further research in this area might prove interesting and furnish insight into the question of the value of a single central market.
II. Background
Futures trading in the United States began as a result of changing patterns of and Review of production and distribution in industry. Time contracts on goods were the Literature instigated to avoid risks associated with inventory accumulation and price changes. To facilitate trading a formal association, now known as the futures exchange, was developed.'
A position in the futures market is termed long or short. The former constitutes an agreement to purchase a particular grade and quantity of a commodity for a specified price at some point in the future. The latter involves an agreement to sell or deliver a commodity with similar specifications. Contract price is determined in an open auction; an open position can be liquidated by making or taking delivery, or by initiating a position equal and opposite to the original one. Gain or loss is associated with price changes as well as transactions costs which include commissions and the opportunity costs associated with depositing a performance bond or margin.
Industrial consumers and producers participate in the market as "hedgers" in order to minimize price risk, and individuals who are willing to assume risk for the opportunity to make a profit participate as "speculators." Hedging can be defined as the initiation of a position in the futures market which is intended as a temporary substitute for the sale or purchase of the actual commodity. Typical hedges include the sale of futures to protect inventory and the purchase of futures to fix prices of commodities which will be used at a later date. Hedging may facilitate the transference of risk by initiating a position in the futures market opposite to that associated with the actual or cash commodity. Parallel or predictable movements in the cash and futures markets are necessary for effective hedging so that the gain or loss in the futures market is offset by the loss or gain in the cash market. It should be emphasized that futures markets are not primary markets.
The commodity exchange provides the physical environment where the transactions can be consummated as well as insuring that the quality of the commodity, if delivery occurs, is consistent with the contract specifications. Delivery can occur with the use of two distinct instruments: (1) the warehouse receipt, and (2) the shipping certificate. The latter is simply a promissory note that a processor or shipper will ship a certain commodity within a designated period of time. The exchange outlines the conditions which must be satisfied and only exchange approved warehouses and shippers can issue instruments which can be used for delivery. It also insures the financial integrity of the market participants. The approval of warehouses and shippers is accomplished through inspection procedures outlined by the exchange and the financial integrity is accomplished by the existence of the clearinghouse. Trading can only be done by members of the exchange and only those For purposes of this paper a new contract is one in which the volume of trading was zero at the beginning of the decade and became positive sometime during the period. designated as clearing members can assume the financial responsibilities associated with initiating a position in the market. The clearinghouse or corporation (when it is a separate firm) mediates between buyers and sellers. When a buyer meets a seller, the trade is consummated by the clearinghouse serving on the opposite side of the contract for both parties. The clearinghouse interposes itself as buyer from the seller and seller to the buyer.
The management of exchange operations is executed jointly by a professional staff and committees of members. Most exchanges are operated as if they were nonprofit membership associations. Membership in the exchange implies privileges in addition to equity. These include acting as futures commission merchants, clearing members, floor brokers, etc., as well as trading from the floor or away from the exchange at differential commissions. It should be noted that floor traders and floor brokers often speculate in one or more commodities and may behave as if they were market makers or specialists. Officially, they are not charged with any function.
III. Prerequisites for a Successful Futures Contract
As indicated earlier, new futures contracts have made a significant contribution in the growth of commodity trading. There are numerous commodities currently being traded for which there were no futures market ten years ago. Defining the feasible set of commodities capable of having active futures markets and efficient contract design has often proven difficult. This is evidenced by failures of contracts in turkeys, frozen shrimp, and apples, as well as other commodities.
There have been numerous speculations concerning the prerequisites for a successful commodity contract; however, there is no definitive evidence that a particular set of prerequisites is either necessary or sufficient for success. This section will be devoted to a discussion of prerequisites which may be necessary for the success of a futures contract.
There are a number of conditions which appear frequently in the literature and seem to be satisfied by commodities currently being traded successfully. These include price variability of the commodity, a market where price is competitively determined, homogeneity (or the close movement of prices of different grades of the commodity), a pattern of forward contracting which breaks down, and the existence of a viable cash market ( a market for immediate delivery) in order to facilitate the delivery procedure. If these specifications are met, then an additional requirement of proper contract specification must be added. Support for all these prerequisites can be found in papers written by Bakken, and Gray. 6 In addition, Gray and Working 7 have presented a limited amount of evidence that success depends on the ability to attract and keep "hedgers" in the market, indicating that speculators will follow them. In a subsequent study, Powers 8 described changes in the pork belly contract, inferring that this made the contract more appealing to hedgers. He concluded that because these contract changes were responsible for the attraction of hedgers, they subsequently drew speculators into the market, too. These results seem to support Gray and Working and represent a description of post-development work after the introduction of the contract.
IV. The Development of the Plywood Futures Contract
According to several members of the Chicago Board of Trade, the concept of a futures market in plywood was discussed as early as the late 1950's. An officer of the exchange recalls interest as early as 1957. Although a paper in 1960 by E.A. Beveridge, who was a commodity economist at Merrill Lynch, advocated a lumber futures market, interest and activity in a plywood futures contract appears to have been limited to investigations by the New Products Committee in 1961 , 1962 , and 1963 . In 1967 , plywood cash prices rose from under $70 at the beginning of the year to about $95 during the summer months, retreating to a little over $70 toward the end of the year. By the middle of 1968, price had rebounded to approximately $100. The stage had been set. The Chicago Board of Trade hired a person at that time who had a knowledge of economic research for what was to become the planning department. He was assigned to work under an assistant to the president. He was a forestry graduate and was to conduct a feasibility study on a lumber or plywood futures contract. Thus research began, and on January 1969 a paper entitled Plywood and Lumber Futures, summary and conclusion of a Chicago Board of Trade Staff Study, was presented to the Executive Vice President. The study was quite extensive: it described the lumber and plywood industry and hypothesized a futures contract for both. Using figures on concentration of producers, size of wholesalers, and institutional relationships in the industry, it concluded that the industry was competitive. The study analyzed both supply and demand; further, it inferred from descriptive and institutional material that, as a result of short-term inelasticities of supply and a shifting inelastic demand, price would be volatile. This was supported by referring to the fluctuations occurring during 1967 and 1968. The report investigated the possiblity that prices of lumber and plywood moved in tandem (as suggested in the analysis of supply and demand) but this was proven to be invalid. The description of the industry in the report implied that an active cash market existed, although the authors did not seem to be looking for this factor specifically. The study indicated that lumber and plywood were homogeneous enough and that correlations in price movements between certain grades were sufficient to ensure a sizable market. Although the study discusses a one-month order file (orders which they had on hand to be shipped out during the coming month), there is no evidence that the research was devoted to determining if a pattern of forward contracting had existed but which broke down.
The report then specified the outlines of a futures contract in both plywood and lumber. The contract recommendations for plywood were:
1.1 Grade-Standard exterior sheathing (C/ D, X) 5 ply, % inch. There was a high correlation between the thickness and ply and it was recommended that premiums and discounts be established for different grades. A sanded contract was a possibility. The Plywood and Lumber Futures Report was delivered to the Executive Vice President with no time schedule worked out for subsequent stages of development. During the weekend of March 29, 1969, which was extended because of the death of former President Eisenhower, he decided to take the study home and drafted a plywood contract. The report seemed to emphasize the development of the plywood contract and the executive decision to eliminate lumber was based on this factor, the fact that the contract was easier to write, and the Executive Vice President's own expertise in that area. A draft contract was prepared on the basis of the feasibility study so that industry officials could comment on a specific form. A fact-finding trip was undertaken on April 10 to the Pacific Northwest to ascertain the industry's receptiveness to a plywood futures contract and to obtain information for subsequent stages of contract design. The initial reception by the producers was promising. It was a difficult educational task, the industry had no experience with futures.
An extremely important piece of information was developed which was to significantly affect the contract development. It was learned that plywood was sold in the cash market with freight being charged according to "industry average weights." Since the actual weights are less than the "industry average weights," the "shipper" receives an apparent windfall. The contract would then need a weights provision to provide the shipper with an incentive to use the futures market. Information was obtained from the sellers on the lead time required between a loading order and shipment. It as also learned there were different grading agencies and that a choice might have to be made among them. The buyers, in a meeting on April 23, stated that they wanted shipment on a delivered basis with freight adjustments. The information obtained from these industrial sources was used to develop the April 29 draft. Additional meetings with industry personnel were held during the next six weeks. The Executive Vice President and the New Products Committee worked jointly on the development of the contract. In this particular case, the Executive Vice President needed a sounding board for the contract provisions. It is traditional in commodity exchanges-which are organized as membership associations-that committees are vested with operational duties and that the professional staff operates under their guidance. Although this is theoretically the case, the facts indicate that in this case the guiding force was the professional staff.
The May 19 draft of the contract now contained new provisions regarding the six points under consideration. There was further modification of other provisions regarding premiums for shipping certificates, etc. Two additional conferences in the Pacific Northwest were held on June 12 and June 20. The report again stipulated that the use of delivered price would draw attention to the existence of underweights and that the contract should use F.O.B. mill prices-not to do so might discourage the long speculator. These two factors resulted in changing the key provision. These findings were reported by the Executive Vice-President. The public announcement that the New York Mercantile Exchange was to start trading in plywood futures indicated that timing was crucial: a memorandum was sent to the President with a proposed timetable of additional steps in the development process. On June 26, the New Products Committee received a report on F.O.B. mill pricing and a standard grade. On July 7, one day prior to a board meeting in which the New Products Committee was to present the plywood futures contract for approval, it received a memorandum from the Executive Vice President. This memorandum indicated that one deliverable grade was acceptable because it constituted 20 to 25 per cent of all sheathing, that most other grades are not interchangeable and that there is little price correlation between grades, the critical factor being that since plywood is manufactured the mill could easily convert its raw materials to standard grade.
On July 8, 1969, the New Products Committee reported its work on the plywood contract. They foresaw three major problems in subsequent development. These included the lack of understanding of futures by the industry, that the many different types of grade traded in the market made it possible to have one deliverable grade, and, finally, that competition was imminent from one exchange definitely with the possibility of another. The committee indicated, however, that it thought these problems could be overcome and proposed a new contract. The Board of Directors of the Chicago Board of Trade recommended that the regulations for the plywood contract be accepted and set July 31 as the date for membership vote. This is the traditional procedure. The Executive Vice President visited the Forest Service and Commodity Exchange Authority on an informal basis to describe the plywood futures contract during mid-July. On July 29, the membership of the Chicago Board of Trade accepted the regulations for the new plywood contract by a vote of 514 to 25. On August 11, the Executive Vice President submitted minor variations in the contract for clarification. The New Products Committee concurrently recommended to the Board that the changes be adopted. As a result of additional contact with the industry, a memorandum was sent to the Board of Directors which broadened the delivery area to include inland areas because they sell on the basis of the Portland, Oregon, freight rate, permitted shipment against a shipping certificate from any plant which might be a regular shipper, and included a revision of the WTL territories. The first and third recommendations were accepted and subsequently included in the contract prior to introduction of trading on December 1, 1969.
After the initiation of trading, the exchange continued its practice of forming a committee of its members to supervise trading in plywood and make recommendations for contract changes. An advisory committee from the plywood industry was also formed to work with the exchange. Continuity in the development stage was assured by appointing a member of the New Products Committee as chairman of the Plywood Committee.
On March 25, 1971 , the chairman of the newly developed ply wood committee recommended that a regular shipper could load a boxcar of plywood at any shipping plant owned or operated by the shipper. On April 30, the committee suggested that the position limit (the number of open contracts an individual speculator can have) be increased from 100 contracts to 300. On July 7,1970, as a result of changing industrial standards, the committee advised that both 4 and 5 ply be included in the contract as deliverable grades. The adoption of these regulations helped expand the commercial use of the market.
The latest change, allowing delivery by warehouses and unrestricted mill delivery, came with trading in the March 1972 contract. The need for this arose from the fact that supply was limited and cash and futures prices were not converging. When the cash and futures prices do not converge, then the option to liquidate a position by delivery may lose its value. Consequently, this may result in an ineffective hedge.
The plywood contract had a volume of 394 contracts in 1969 and 47,426 in 1970; there were more than 1,000 contracts settled by delivery in 1970. The number of certified shippers rose from six declared regular (or approved by the Exchange) on July 1, 1970 (three of which are among the top ten firms in the industry), to 11 regular from July, 1971 to July, 1972. It seems safe to conclude, then, that the plywood futures contract on the Chicago Board of Trade has been a successful innovation. Trading volume in the third quarter of 1972 averaged 1,281 per day.
At this point, it is appropriate to review some of the developmental features of the plywood futures contract and to elaborate on some characteristics of the research and development activity. The inventive process, from its inception to the initiation of trading, was approximately 17 months. There seems to be no definitive rule for originating ideas for new contracts although the membership is an important resource. The Chicago Board of Trade is the largest exchange with the ability to undertake the necessary research and the good fortune, in the case of the plywood futures contract, to have had an individual who had particular talents. This may suggest that the direction of inventive activity is based somewhat on the distribution of skills in the professional staff and the members of the exchange as well as among the different exchanges.
The research phase determined that a futures market in plywood was feasible on the basis of several factors. One aspect worth noting in regard to this phase is that there was no attempt to examine if a pattern of forward contracting that broke down existed. The Executive Vice President indicated that although there was a latent demand for forward contracting in the plywood industry, it rarely or never emerged. This has important implications since it has been noted by various persons that this may be a necessary prerequisite for establishing a successful futures contract. The research phase also developed a preliminary sketch of a lumber and plywood contract with incomplete specifications of grade, pricing basis, delivery points, delivery mode and unit and billing and freight rates. An executive decision was made immediately and the plywood futures contract was developed. Interactions by the Executive Vice President and the New Products Committee, after consulting with industrial producers and users, resulted in the evolution of the contract to a form which was approved by the Board of Directors and the exchange membership. Decisions regarding the essentials of the delivery instrument and the delivery mode and units were consistent with the original recommendations with only the details to be worked out. Delivery points were also easy to arrange; they went through several modifications as the contract was developed but eventually converged to the final specification. The grade, billing and pricing bases were the most difficult provisions to specify. However, a standard grade was eventually arrived at with no premiums or discounts. The pricing basis was probably the most difficult to establish; it was changed completely during the development of the contract. Price had to conform to current practices in the industry without violating their view of how the cash market operated. In addition, a misspecification would result in an inequitable contract and possibly in its immediate demise.
The research and development of an exchange involves the interaction between professional staff and the membership to develop a contract. The professional administrator is essential for developing the technical details of the contract so that it is consistent with the needs of the industry. The membership serves as a sounding board for the staff; it may perhaps spot weaknesses which professional traders might be able to take advantage of and possibly cause the demise of the contract.
The introduction of a new commodity on an exchange does not bring this process to an end. Commodity contracts are agreements which take into account the current industrial environment; thus as the environment changes, the contract should change. An appropriate strategy seems to be to design a feasible contract in order to generate a moderate amount of trading. Subsequent changes in provisions will broaden its appeal to hedgers and subsequently to speculators.
The emergence of a successful plywood contract on the Chicago Board of Trade is probably related to characteristics of the inventive activity as well as the structure of the exchange. Another smaller exchange, the New York Mercantile Exchange, introduced a plywood contract several months earlier.
Although volume in that contract exceeded 5,000 contracts in the first four months, there have been no trades since January 31,1972. Among the reasons for the success of the Chicago Board of Trade contract was that it was designed to appeal to hedgers and thereby facilitate their entry into the market. If Gray and Working 1 are correct, this is what led to speculators entering the market. An interesting example of the difference in contracts on the two exchanges was that the New York Mercantile Exchange's contract made no recognition of the practice of using "industry average weights"; therefore, it was unappealing to hedgers and inconsistent with their traditional way of transacting business. Another important difference is that the delivery instrument at the Chicago Board of Trade is a shipping certificate, while that of the New York Mercantile Exchange is an on-track delivery. The latter may be inconvenient for the long speculator who takes delivery and wants to dispose of the commodity in the cash market. An article in the principal newspaper for commodity trading on the inception of trading at the Chicago Board of Trade stated:
Deliveries will be made by a shipping certificate issued by plywood mills approved as 'regular for delivery'. And this delivery system may prove to be a key to future success in the Chicago contract.
'' Roger W. Gray & Holbrook Working, supra note 7.
The New York plywood contract calls for f.o.b. on track delivery. Thus, a "long" who receives notice from the New York Mercantile Exchange will own a loaded boxcar on a rail siding at a West Coast shipping point.
However, a person who receives notice on a Chicago Board of Trade contract will merely be presented with a shipping certificate, which conceivably could be held for a year before being exercised. This also will permit the holder to retender a delivery on futures.
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The shipping certificate was appealing to the industrial users because it matched the "order file" approach of the cash market.
The apparent superiority of the shipping certificate resulted in commission houses recommending that its commercial and speculative customers participate in the Board of Trade market as was ascertained during interviews conducted by the author during the course of this study. This is substantiated by the following remark which appeared in the Journal of Commerce.
"The Chicago Board of Trade contract... would appear to offer somewhat greater flexibility to the would-be buyer" one brokerage house has advised its customers.
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The shipping certificate also offers the advantage that the potential success of the contract and the participation of commercial users can be ascertained easily by the number of applicants to become regular for delivery.
It should be noted that larger exchanges may have experiences with a larger variety of delivery instruments and consequently be able to choose among them in a more efficient manner. Success may also be a result of the existence of speculators who are acting as specialists on the floor of the exchange, buying or selling at any reasonable price initially in order to develop a liquid market. This is often cited as one of the reasons for the success of certain exchanges in general and the Chicago Board of Trade in particular.
14 Interviews conducted by the author with various segments of users further substantiated the fact that the Chicago Board of Trade captured the market because it achieved liquidity faster as a result of its floor traders. This liquidity is related to research and development activity since committee members who acquire knowledge of the contract in the early stages are the ones who may become the "market makers." If they are better capitilized on larger exchanges, this may represent a form of economies of scale. Another possible reason for the success of the Chicago Board of Trade's plywood futures contract might be the quality of self-regulation on the exchange. The development of the contract was always characterized by efforts to insure that the market was not manipulated. The requirements for a mill to be regular for delivery were extensive. The contract was initiated with hedgers not being allowed to honor shipping certificates from all plants, but only from those which were specifically declared regular. The number of shipping certificates a firm could issue was limited. In addition, the initial position limits were small; all positions of 25 or more contracts had to be reported to the Office of Investigations and Audits; total positions were limited to 100 contracts. The latter was lower than for other commodities. At each stage of market development, the exchange was willing to sacrifice liquidity for guarantees of financial integrity. Although it had the option to make no rules regarding regulations on positions limits, the exchange behaved as if it was trading a regulated commodity. This was not true of the New York Mercantile Exchange. Although there may be no need to guard initially against price manipulation by requiring that large positions be reported and that they be limited, this requirement may induce greater confidence by member and nonmember speculators and hedgers and attract them to the market. The initial restrictions on delivery may also have the same effect. The regulations imposed by the Chicago Board of Trade were as strict and, in some respects, stricter than they would have been had they been imposed by a governmental authority.
A comparison can be made between the inventive activity of the various exchanges. The Chicago Board of Trade introduced six new contracts in the decade of the 1960's and three were successful. The New York Mercantile Exchange introduced nine commodities during a similar period and only one of these has enjoyed some period of success. However, the most successful innovator during the period was the Chicago Mercantile Exchange which introduced 16 commodities of which four were successful.
It appears that the Chicago Board of Trade was successful in the case of the plywood contract because of its ability to design a superior contract with the result of greater support from the industry and commission houses, the liquidity provided by better capitalized floor traders and the quality of selfregulation.
There are several other characteristics of the design process which should be noted. All of the exchanges involved in the forest products area seemed to know that the other exchanges were designing contracts which might be competitive. The result was to speed up the research and development process. Competition among exchanges in the case of plywood in particular, and other commodities in general, may have additional spillover. The New York Mercantile Exchange, which originally introduced the plywood contract has been undergoing a dramatic change. It has hired a professional administrator as president, and he in turn has hired an economist to direct their research activities. The Chairman of the Board and other members of that exchange seemed to have realized the importance of professionalization and have taken the appropriate measures. Another characteristic of innovation is that in the process of searching for an appropriate grade, other commodities in the general area are considered. There are externalities which help in the development of subsequent contracts. As commercial users become members of the exchange, the ability to develop further contracts is improved. That this leads to specialization might be argued on the basis of the Chicago Board of Trade specializing in grain, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange specializing in meat products and live animals and the Cotton Exchange specializing in fruits and vegetables such as frozen concentrated orange juice and tomato paste.
The emergence of a formal department of research and development in the Chicago Board of Trade indicates that the exchange members and staff realized its importance as a result of their experience with the development of the plywood contract. The administrative duties of the Executive Vice President could not be combined with the research and development activity as had previously been done. The establishment of the research and development department represented another step implementing the recommendations of the reorganization plan made in 1966 to professionalize the staff.
V. Summary
The purpose of this study has been to describe an extremely important and Conclusions activity undertaken by commodity exchanges-research and development.
The inventive process can be divided into two distinct stages. The first part consists of a formal examination of certain established criteria to determine whether or not the commodity can be adapted to futures trading. Certain preliminary aspects of contract provisions are also considered. The second stage is divided into two parts. This includes an initial drafting of the contract and its subsequent convergence to the form existent when trading commences. The second consists of post-introduction changes in specifications intended to broaden contract appeal. The entire activity is characterized by interactions among professional exchange staff, exchange members and advisory groups who are commercial users of the market. The particular case study is of interest because it resulted in the formal establishment of a Research and Development department in the exchange.
